



(i) clear up misunderstandings concerning the concept 
utopia; (ii) illustrate how a utopia ought to be understood; 
(iii) suggest ways of clarifying Rawls’ skepticism of utopian 
thought; (iv) help resolve the aforementioned criticisms. 
Once the Rawlsian adopts this conception of utopia, the 
charge that Rawls’ realistic utopia is too utopian, or insuf-
ficiently utopian, can be circumvented.
1. Rawls’ realistic utopia
Rawls’ realistic utopia is realistic because it tackles current 
and actual problems, and because it does not put unreaso-
nable expectations on its citizens. Rawls’ realistic utopia is 
utopian in that it sets goals and shows us what to reach for. 
Rawls combines ideal theory—defining normative stan-
dards—and non-ideal theory, developing measures suited 
for real-world conditions. Rawls’ aim, therefore, is to con-
verge the ideal with reality—the “is” and the “ought”—
and model a world of sovereign states under a reasonable 
and just, realistically-utopian, law of peoples. 
For a liberal society to be realistically utopian, accor-
ding to Rawls, seven conditions should be met (Rawls 
1999, 12). For our purposes, the first three are of impor-
tance, being conditions for a liberal society to be realistic 
and utopian. The first condition is stability for the right 
Rawls has received criticism from realists, declaring a realistic utopia to be too utopian, and from cos-
mopolitans that it is not utopian enough. In this essay, 
I suggest the disagreement can be alleviated by clarifying 
an ambiguity in the concept utopia. There are two under-
standings of utopia: (1) a perfect and/or ideal society and 
(2) an implausibly idealistic, unrealistic and/or impractical 
society (quixotic). Most, including Rawls, appear to hold 
these meanings simultaneously, reducing utopia to an 
unachievable ideal. We need to remove the second mea-
ning of utopia, and acquire a better understanding of the 
first. In short, I defend the idea of a realistic utopia by pro-
posing a new way of understanding what a utopia ought 
to be. In doing so, I draw on Ursula K. Le Guin’s notion 
of a utopia in her science fiction novel The Dispossessed. 
First, however, an excursion into Rawls’ realistic utopia is 
required. Second, we explore criticism raised by realists 
and cosmopolitans. In this context, a realist is one who 
accentuates competitiveness and power in political rela-
tions. A cosmopolitan underscores cooperation, and that 
human beings should be members of one single commu-
nity. Finally, we examine Le Guin’s conception of utopia. 
Le Guin’s idea of a utopia can, I opine, improve Rawls’ 
conception of a realistic utopia in the following four ways: 
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Rawls’ realistic utopia has been subject to much criticism. The Realist claims Rawls’ realistic utopia to be too uto-
pian. The Cosmopolitan, on the other hand, claims Rawls’ realistic utopia to be insufficiently utopian. In this essay, 
I argue that the criticism can be circumvented by means of clarifying an ambiguity in the concept of utopia. I argue 
that the Realist is not criticizing Rawls for being utopian, but unrealistic, impractical and idealistic (quixotic). The 
Cosmopolitan might, however, be right in criticizing Rawls for not being utopian enough. The orthodox understan-
ding of utopia, adopted by the Cosmopolitan is, however, in itself quixotic. Drawing on Le Guin’s The Dispossessed, 
I will propose a novel understanding of how utopia ought to be understood. Once the Rawlsian adopts this concep-
tion of utopia, it alleviates the objections raised by the Realist and the Cosmopolitan.
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reasons. If the relationship between Russia and the US in 
the cold war was stable, it was definitely not stable for 
the right reasons. According to the second condition, a 
realistic utopia must be workable and applicable in the 
political and social world of today. Call this second con-
dition realistically grounded. The third condition specifies 
that “A necessary condition for a political conception of 
justice to be utopian is that it uses political (moral) ideals, 
principles and concepts to specify a reasonable and just 
society” (Rawls 1999, 14). A society cannot, accordingly, 
be based on process and rules alone, but rather on somet-
hing purposeful, like social justice and equality. We need 
reasonable liberal conceptions of justice specifying basic 
rights and liberties. Call this third condition desired results.
A realistic utopia should include three additional 
features: the first a fact, the second a criterion, the third 
an opportunity. According to the fact of reasonable plu-
ralism, we are bound to reasonably disagree on such areas 
as morality and religion because of different cultures and 
traditions of thought (Rawls 2009, 11).1 As long as it is 
a reasonable Catholicism, or Old Norse polytheism, for 
example, none should be disregarded because of disagre-
ement between them. It would, conversely, be unreasona-
ble to impose a religion on someone. It would, inversely, 
be unreasonable to deny someone the choice of whether to 
be religious. The criterion of reciprocity specifies that “[...] 
representatives must think not only that it is reasonable for 
them to propose it, but also that it is reasonable for other 
peoples to accept it” (Rawls 1999, 14). The opportunity is 
overlapping consensus, where citizens endorse a core set of 
laws for different reasons. The idea is that opposing religi-
ons and moral doctrines can agree on particular principles 
of justice. 
In summary, Rawls’ realistic utopia could be a model 
for achieving global justice. Rawls’ hope is that the combi-
nation of two seemingly contradictory notions, the realis-
tic and the utopian, can lead to a just society that is stable 
over time.2
2. The Cosmopolitan and the Realist
The criticisms leveled by both the Realist and the 
Cosmopolitan originates in Rawls’ attempt at unifying 
realism and cosmopolitanism (Audard 2006, 59).3 The 
Realist complains that Rawls is being too utopian. The 
Cosmopolitan accuses him of being insufficiently utopian. 
Before presenting the criticism, however, I will try to eluci-
date the differences in the realistic vision, and the utopian 
vision of the Cosmopolitan.
2.1 Competing visions
One challenge for Rawls’ realistic utopia is that it com-
bines two entirely different ways of thinking, namely a 
realistic and a utopian mode of thought (Sowell 1987, 22-
3).4 Generally, realist thinking is skeptical, and favors a 
rule-based system emphasizing process. Utopian thinking, 
antithetically, converges on desired results achieved through 
emphasizing ends instead of means.
At the root of this divide is two competing notions of 
human nature (Ibid., 30). For the Realist, human nature 
is morally and cognitively limited. We need, therefore, in-
centives to encourage us to do good for society and deter us 
from doing bad. The Utopian disagrees; humans are capa-
ble of goodness and self-sacrifice without incentives. The 
solution for the Utopian, then, lies not in feeding man’s 
ego, but rather in committing to ideals. Moreover, uto-
pian thinking aspires to a world without war, where power 
is no longer the dominant determinate for relationships. 
The Realist is skeptical of the prospect of achieving these 
ideals. To sum up, realists stress constraints, utopians stress 
opportunities. What Rawls is trying to do—quite ingeni-
ously—is combine them to achieve a realistically constrai-
ned utopia.
A final distinction is needed. The Utopian regards po-
litics as a function of ethics, while the Realist regards ethics 
as a function of politics (Carr, Cox & Cox 1981, 42). The 
Rawlsian and the Cosmopolitan agree, therefore, that po-
litics can be a function of ethics (Rawls 1999, 35).5 The 
Realist disagrees, and considers normative principles irre-
levant for solving international conflicts (Audard 2006, 1).
2.2 The Realist
Realism rose up, amongst other reasons, as a countermo-
vement to the dominance of Rawlsian influence within 
political theory (Galston 2010, 285). The Realist opposes 
the Rawlsian tendency “to evade, displace or escape from 
politics” (Ibid.). According to the Realist, the utopian per-
spective of the Rawlsian ought to be avoided. Specifically, 
there are three remedies the Realist suggests for a utopian 
framework (Ibid., 394-5).6 First, it is important to always 
be aware of the possibility of regress as well as progress. 
Second, it is better to shift focus to the worst-case scenario 
instead of hoping for the best. Third, principles cannot be 
standards for political life unless they are feasible in the 
real world.
There are at least three additional reasons why the 
Realist rejects Rawls’ realistic utopia. First, for reasons 
outlined above, a realistic utopia is not realistically ground-
ed. Second, the idea of overlapping consensus is implau-
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sible (Galston 2016, 112).7 Even assuming overlapping 
consensus were possible, it could not provide normative 
facts (Ibid., 113).8 Third, the Realist considers conflict as 
ineradicable, and views “political moralists” as hopelessly 
optimistic of achieving a normative or practical consen-
sus (Galston 2010, 396).9 Accordingly, if one espouses the 
realist view, the best we can hope for is a modus vivendi.10 
Hence, Rawls’ realistic utopia is too utopian.
2.3 The Cosmopolitan
The Cosmopolitan has four misgivings concerning the 
Rawlsian realistic utopia. First, the Cosmopolitan regards 
Rawlsian ideals as feeble, and not superior to the status quo 
(Brock 2010, 90). Rawls has, in fact, offered nothing more 
than a modus vivendi with oppressor states (Ackerman 
1994, 383). Second, the Cosmopolitan finds the law of 
peoples to be unstable because it involves tolerance of un-
just regimes. For instance, every Islamic nation will have 
women who insist on equal rights. The Cosmopolitan then 
asks: “Given these facts, the West must choose, and why 
should we choose to betray our own principles and side 
with the oppressors rather than the oppressed?” (Ibid.). 
Third, for the Cosmopolitan, the scope Rawls sets out for 
his theory of justice is too limited.11 In The Law of Peoples, 
Rawls is concerned with justice between societies instead 
of justice within societies. The Cosmopolitan finds this 
peculiar given their close relation, enforcing the worry of 
relaxed toleration among non-liberal societies to do what 
they please with their citizens. Fourth, the Cosmopolitan 
objects to representatives making choices for the society, 
and not all the world’s members (Brock 2010, 61).12 In 
sum, the Cosmopolitan wants the scope of a Rawlsian rea-
listic utopia to be global, and the basis to be on the indivi-
dual. Hence, Rawls’ realistic utopia is not utopian enough.
2.4 Resolving misconceptions of the term utopia
Rawls is being accused of being culturally imperialistic, 
while at the same time too considerate of non-democratic 
countries (Audard 2006, 16). The Cosmopolitan finds 
Rawls insufficient both in liberal and individualist acco-
unts, while the Realist (and the Relativist) thinks him too 
liberal and individualistic (Ibid.). It does not appear that 
Rawls can be utopian and realistic concurrently.
However, it seems to me that the Realist suffers under 
the second (mis)comprehension of utopia.13 They are not 
questioning whether it is an ideal society. What Rawls is 
being accused of, perhaps unsurprisingly, is being unrealis-
tic. The Realist criticizes Rawls’ negative stand to modus 
vivendi because anything else is unrealistic. The claim that 
principles has to be feasible in order to be good standards 
for political life is based on attainability, not whether the 
aspiration is ideal or not. Furthermore, the Realist’s criti-
cism of «hoping for the best» does not describe what that 
«best» is. Rather, they denounce hope itself as improbable. 
This all culminates in whether a realistic utopia is realistic 
—not utopian. Perhaps, then, the Realist should refrain 
from calling a realistic utopia too utopian, as if it was an 
epithet. The criticism of a realistic utopia not leaving room 
for conflict and regress, however, still stands.
The Cosmopolitan has the correct understanding of 
utopia as an ideal future. However, challenges can be put 
to the vision of that future. Let us, therefore, remove the 
quixoticness of utopia, and turn our focus to how a perfect 
and ideal society ought to be.14
3. An ambiguous utopia
I begin this section by looking at the orthodox notion of 
a utopia. Then, I outline some literary distinctions, be-
fore turning to Le Guin’s The Dispossessed: An Ambiguous 
Utopia. I shall argue that Le Guin’s notion of a utopia is 
one the Rawlsian should adopt.
3.1 Utopia
The term utopia was coined by Thomas More,15 in his 
book by the same name (2003, 147). The notion was ba-
sed on a pun: outopia, meaning no place; eutopia, mea-
ning good place.16 More’s Utopia was, consequently, jud-
ged unlikely by his peers, which is one of the reasons why 
utopia received its double meaning (Madeline & Rogan 
2009, 309).17 Post More, the focus in literature converted 
to making a blueprint of a “good” place. Utopian literature 
has been changing ever since. Prior to the 1960s, however, 
it seems to have some recurring characteristics: a perfect 
place, safe environment, universal agreement, perfect har-
mony and everlasting peace. In addition, it is often a social 
commentary, imagining a society with a given set of con-
ditions often chosen to illuminate the wrongs of its time 
(Ibid., 314).18
Rawls is skeptical of utopian thinking, and enumera-
tes three dangerous tendencies (Curtis 2005, 266). First, 
utopians assume any problem to be solvable. Second, uto-
pians might let ends justify means. Third, utopians assume 
everyone can be attracted to the same vision, hence com-
promise becomes difficult. A realistic utopia suggests, ho-
wever, that Rawls is trying to determine whether a utopian 
society is possible. Why, then, does he constantly empha-
size its realisticity and not its utopian component? (Brock 
2010, 91). Why even use utopia? I find Shaun P. Young’s 
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answer to this quite compelling:
Rawls emphasizes that our ambitions for the future 
character of the global order need not and should not 
be restricted to what is currently possible: the “actu-
al” must not overwhelm our beliefs concerning what 
might be achieved (2011, 26). 
Put differently, it is important for the Rawlsian to retain 
the notion of a utopia in a society.
3.2 Literary distinctions
Margaret Atwood draws an illuminating distinction bet-
ween science fiction and speculative fiction: whereas scien-
ce fiction deals with “technologies we don’t yet have, other 
universes[...]”, speculative fiction deals with this planet; 
“it doesn’t use things we do not already have or are not al-
ready developing” (Mancuso 2016). The Dispossessed is an 
example of both, having sophisticated space travel we do 
not have and political problems we do have. In combina-
tion, Le Guin can illuminate today’s issues with tomorrow’s 
outlook.
Another helpful distinction is between written and 
unwritten worlds (Stow 2002, 78). Instead of the com-
mon distinction between imagination and reality, which 
might force the imagination out of reality, the distinction 
between written and unwritten worlds better helps dis-
tinguish between the world of the text and the world in 
which that text was written (Stow 2005, 37). To write fic-
tion is not just imagining, but also being aware of what is 
going on in real life.
The complexity of the relationship between the writ-
ten and unwritten world illustrates the problem with uto-
pia in political theory: Either the two worlds are entirely 
separate, reducing utopia to a thought experiment with 
little practical importance (idealistic), or the distinction 
is ignored and utopia is seen as a detailed blueprint for a 
future society (Ibid.). This is how utopia has been thought 
of in the history of political thinking, from Thucydides 
to Rawls. Rawls differs from his historic predecessors, ho-
wever, in wanting to combine the two in a realistic utopia. 
Rawls is still, however, under the spell of dichotomy. In 
The Dispossessed, Le Guin shows us a third solution to the 
problem of Utopia. In her creation of two fully realized 
literary worlds, Anarres and Urras, Le Guin shows a way 
out of juxtaposing realities as a source of critical insights 
(Ibid.). The Dispossessed can be read as a postmodern uto-
pian story, its main feature being self-reflexive; challenging 
the reader to review what we think of a utopia. Similarly, 
Le Guin’s utopia can be depicted as a critical utopia, which 
focuses on global exploitation, gender and race inequality, 
and class antagonism (Moylan 1986, 10). Le Guin does 
not want to look at utopias as blueprints, nor as simple 
thought experiments, but as “ways of exploring, amongst 
other things, the politics, relationships and emotions of 
the unwritten world under different conditions” (Stow 
2005, 38).
3.3 Le Guin’s ambiguous utopia
Le Guin writes: “If you like you can read it, and a lot of 
other science fiction, as a thought experiment” (2000, 12). 
Let us abide by her example. The following is a rendition 
of Le Guin’s The Dispossessed.
Imagine two planets with the names Anarres and Urras. 
In the beginning Anarres was the moon of Urras. Due to 
ideological disagreements, however, a group of people li-
terally got sent to the moon by the government. On this 
new planet, Anarres, they created a world vastly different 
to that of Urras. The new world was based on freedom and 
created with no government and few rules. Anarres turned 
out to be, however, a difficult world. “Anarres is all dust 
and dry hills. All meagry, all dry […] The towns are very 
small and dull, they are dreary. No palaces. Life is dull, and 
hard work. You can’t always have what you want, or even 
what you need, because there isn’t enough” (Ibid., 114). 
Urras, on the other hand, is a beautiful place. People from 
Urras, called Urrasti have an abundance of everything.
 
Enough air, enough rain, grass, oceans, food, music, 
buildings, factories, machines, books, clothes, history 
[…] Everything is beautiful, here. Only not the faces. 
On Anarres nothing is beautiful, nothing but the faces 
[…] Here you see the jewels, there you see the eyes. 
And in the eyes you see the splendour, the splendour 
of the human spirit (Ibid.).
On Urras, however, there is no trust. They don’t know 
where allegiances lie. On Anarres, there is no allegiance, 
so there is no reason not to trust. On Urras basic rights are 
not a given. On Anarres, not having basic rights is unthin-
kable. On Urras each is alone on a heap of what he owns. 
On Anarres they have nothing but each other. The Urrasti 
are possessed, the Anarri the dispossessed.
The main character of the book, Shevek, gets the same 
choice that I give you now: where do you want to live? 
Second question: which world would you consider to be 
the most utopian? Last question: do the first and second 
question have the same answer? The answer to the second 
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question is, in my opinion, Anarres. It is not, however, ob-
vious that Anarres is the answer to both questions. In fact, 
I would hazard that most people would want to live on 
Urras. Let us consider in more detail what makes Anarres 
a utopian candidate.19
On Anarres, people are enjoying individual freedom. 
Being confused on Urras, Shevek asks: “Why do you talk 
in abstractions? … It’s not names of countries, it is people 
killing each other. Why do soldiers go? Why does a man 
go and kill strangers?” (Le Guin 2002, 188). On Anarres 
they are in alliance with peoples, not some unseen state or 
government. In addition, there is no forced labor (Ibid.). 
Everyone chips in on the “dirty work” when necessary. 
Accordingly, no one must do hard or degrading work full 
time.
On Anarres, there is no sense of possession. As a result, 
people do not rob and murder. They have no reason to do 
so, nobody owns anything for anyone to steal. Not being 
possessed in this way, people earn according to the work 
they do. “Nothing is yours. It is to use. It is to share. If you 
will not share it you cannot use it” (Ibid., 26). On Anarres, 
they have no possessive pronouns. People would not say 
“my shirt”, but instead “the shirt that I use”. Clothing is 
made communally by people who have volunteered on a 
clothing making assignment. Shevek is perplexed to see, 
on Urras, that “[a]ll the people in all the shops were either 
buyers or sellers. They had no relation to the things but 
that of possession” (Ibid., 111).
On Anarres, people are happy. Happiness is the re-
sponsibility of the individual, but the conditions for at-
taining happiness is the responsibility of the community; 
conditions such as housing, education and enough food.20 
On Anarres, people are accepted for who they are. There 
is no punishment for sexual practice, except that of rape 
(Ibid., 204). Furthermore, they do not distinguish, in any 
significant way, between men and women. On Urrus, on 
the contrary, there are significant gender differences. For 
instance, no women are scientists on Urrus, and the idea 
of it is found to be ridiculous.
Reconsidering the questions above, I would think that 
most people would still want to live on Urras, while at the 
same time consider Anarres most utopian. In other words, 
people would not choose to live in an ideal society. I think 
this illustrates some complexities concerning the concept 
of utopia, raising questions like what a utopia can be, what 
factors a utopia depends on, and whether utopia is an end 
state or a comparative quality.
If this is all that there is to Anarres, however, Le Guin’s 
utopia would suffer from the same shortcoming of quixo-
ticness as the other utopias. Indeed, if read in isolation, 
the Anarres chapters of The Dispossessed bear a striking re-
semblance to a perfectionist utopia (Ferns 2005, 254). Le 
Guin solves this problem with the admission that some 
parts of human nature and aspects of the world are una-
voidable. There are three main elements that help distance 
Le Guin’s utopia from the orthodox notion of utopia: am-
biguity, skepticism and the need for change. 
Anarres is ambiguous because it inhabits two concepts 
previously thought incompatible with utopia: imperfecti-
on and suffering (Le Guin 2002, 52-3). Suffering is a natu-
ral part of life, however, not just on Anarres. Imperfection 
is based on the fact that a world will always involve such 
things as pain and suffering, and will always depend on the 
world we live in and the creatures that live on it. We see, 
therefore, how Le Guin’s utopia is realistically grounded. It 
is feasible in the world as we know it.
The Dispossessed is different from its utopian antece-
dents in that it does not maintain the separation between 
utopia and reality (Ferns 2005, 255). Le Guin is skeptical 
of thinking of a utopia in isolation, detached from human 
nature and history. Anarres is not immune to famine, vi-
ruses, conflicts and suffering and political disputes. One 
of the most illuminating examples of her skepticism is the 
lack of a happy ending in The Dispossessed. It has an open 
ending, not telling the reader if all goes well. It is the same 
with a utopia, never knowing what the future brings.
To see the need for change in a utopia we need another 
plunge into The Dispossessed. By our notion of written and 
unwritten worlds, perhaps we can learn from the written 
world of Anarres to incite change on the unwritten world 
of present-day earth. When the settlers arrived on Anarres, 
they had an ideology based on principles of freedom, cal-
led Odonianism. On present-day Anarres, however, they 
have forgotten the ideology. Shevek argues:
[…] we didn’t come to Anarres for safety, but for freed-
om. If we must all agree, all work together, we’re no 
better than a machine. The duty of the individual is to 
accept no rule, to be the initiator of his own acts, to be 
responsible. Only if he does so will the society live, and 
change, and adapt, and survive (Le Guin 2002, 295). 
[…] We fear being outcast, being called lazy, dysfunc-
tional, egoising. We fear our neighbour’s opinion more 
than we respect our own freedom of choice … We’ve 
made laws, laws of conventional behaviour, built walls 
all around ourselves, and we can’t see them, because 
they’re part of our thinking (Ibid., 272). 
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On Anarres, individualism is important, and universal 
agreement is not a virtue.21 If people accept being ruled, 
even if it is through neighbors and conventional behavior, 
people are not free. The inhabitants of Anarres have been 
so caught up with the social conscience that they have fai-
led to realize that they are conforming to laws, effectively 
indoctrinating themselves. This is the primary reason why 
they are in need of change, in need of a revolution. The 
secondary reason is that scientific progress and informa-
tion are impeded on Anarres, justified by the hard work in 
need of doing. The tertiary reason for a revolution is that 
people are measured in utility. People are not, for instance, 
allowed to practice music since music is not viewed as use-
ful. A friend of Shevek complains: “The circle has come 
right back round to the most vile kind of profiteering 
utilitarianism” (Ibid., 147). It is an illuminating example 
of a tendency revolutions have to relapse into something 
all too similar to the social order they were designed to 
overthrow (Ferns 2005, 250). Without a permanent revo-
lution, a constant reevaluation of society, people become 
stagnant. Shevek, in collaboration with some friends, crea-
tes a faction trying to change the status quo; the modus vi-
vendi. They make information and research open and free 
for everyone. In addition, Shevek travels to Urras creating 
friction on both planets, igniting change. Anarres is able 
to revitalize its revolutionary potential only when Shevek 
annihilates the wall that has cut his home world off from 
contact with other worlds (Somay 2005, 242).
In sum, then, Le Guin’s utopia is ambiguous in relation 
to the orthodox idea of a utopia; it is not a final, static goal, 
but rather a work in progress. Le Guin is a skeptic rooted 
in reality. Constant change is not just a need, but a premise 
for a utopia. A utopia should be dynamic, premised on an 
acceptance of a reality with social conflicts and historical 
change (Davis 2005, 18). The process of utopia is a never-
ending (r)evolution (Rodgers 2005, 191). 
There are two additional features that make Anarres 
utopian. The first is its inhabitants’ efforts to uphold the 
principle that one cannot justify the happiness of some by 
sacrificing or degrading other people (Davis 2005, xxi). 
The second is that violence, which unavoidably will hap-
pen, has been disconnected from institutions (Stillman 
2005, 60). A Rawlsian would not adopt such a disconnec-
tion from institutions. A Rawlsian should, however, incor-
porate the principle of freedom, and the three elements of 
ambiguity, skepticism and change.22
3.4 Rawls’ ambiguous utopia
As we saw in section 3.1, Rawls has three apprehensions of 
a utopian mode of thought. I am going to shorthand them 
here as (1) quixotism, (2) ends justifying means and (3) 
dogmatism. In my opinion, Le Guin’s ambiguous utopia 
withstands all three concerns. Why not begin with the lat-
ter, and work our way backwards.
Rawls is famously critical of utilitarianism for its te-
leology. He has the same misgiving of utopian thinking. 
Rawls suspects that utopianism breeds a dogmatism laying 
down principles that are undeniably true (Curtis 2005, 
267). This is exactly what Le Guin rejects when she choo-
ses the more chaotic and difficult world of Anarres as a 
utopia over the dogmatic world of Urras (Ibid., 270). The 
guiding principles of Odonianism are not intended as ap-
peals to a shared future outcome, but as a common ground 
always open to interpretation. The possibilities inherent in 
the concept of utopia, that should be sought, is not dog-
matic perfectionism, but skepticism (Ibid., 266). Anarres 
is a skeptical utopia—resembling the notion of a critical 
utopia, as mentioned in section 3.1.—far from the ordi-
narily visioned utopia of final perfection. Furthermore, Le 
Guin’s utopia is both realistic and realistically grounded. 
Anarres is a world with ongoing struggles, imperfect ideals 
and in constant need of re-shaping in light of changing 
conditions. Anarres, therefore, is not a dogmatic utopia.
The need for change and rethinking in a society, illus-
trates how ends could not justify means for Le Guin. When 
injustice does occur, as it has on Anarres, the responsibi-
lity falls on the people to revolt, which Shevek (finally) 
attempts to motivate. The current conditions are not ac-
ceptable, neither on Anarres nor Urras. Change is needed 
in a utopia. The ends in itself might be interchangeable.
We removed quixotism from the concept of utopia 
in section 2.4. Recall the three meanings quixotism en-
compasses: idealism, impracticality and unrealisticness.23 
Anarres is not a perfect society. Consequently, it is not too 
idealistic. Anarres does not assume perfect harmony, nor 
absence of conflict. Consequently, it is not impractical. 
Anarres have constant problems, disagreements and suf-
fering. Consequently, it is not unrealistic. Anarres is, in 
conclusion, not quixotic. “Our society is practical. Maybe 
too practical”, Shevek says to a fellow scientist on Urrus. 
No longer an idealist like the settlers were, Shevek is more 
like a pessimist when saying, “What is idealistic about so-
cial cooperation, mutual aid, when it is the only means of 
staying alive?” (Le Guin 2002, 113-4). They have achie-
ved their ideal on Anarres because the ideal is grounded 
in reality. Le Guin’s ambiguous utopia is not meant to be 
perfect. Rather, like Odonianism, it is intended as a focal 
point for creative, thought-provoking, and politically en-
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gaged debate (Davis 2005, xxvi).
The question remains, however: is Anarres sufficiently 
utopian? I think it is. Anarres is utopian, not because of 
the conditions on the planet; not because of a miraculous 
change in human nature; not because of a final goal finally 
reached; not because of universal agreement - no, it is a 
utopia despite the conditions on the planet; despite hu-
man nature; despite imperfection. A utopia depends not 
on conditions of a world, but the people on it. The Anarri 
refuses to spurn the principles of freedom.24 Happiness 
cannot be justified by sacrificing some people for others.25
Reconsidering some of the requirements of a Rawlsian 
realistic utopia, we can see that Le Guin’s utopia aims for 
desired results but remains realistically grounded. It is 
not a stable utopia, but unstable for the right reasons. I 
think that (in)stability for the right reasons hold, albeit 
paradoxically. Indeed, a utopian society depends on this 
instability. We have seen that the Anarri are imposing a 
lack of freedom on themselves. This is one example of the 
constant need for change. We need to continually consider 
possible regress and progress. Furthermore, the fact of rea-
sonable pluralism is retained in an ambiguous utopia be-
cause disagreement and conflict occur, but the underlying 
principles are agreed upon. The criterion of reciprocity be-
comes a non-problem, directly going against the Anarri’s 
principles of freedom. Overlapping consensus should hold 
on Anarres because there is no religion, and Odonianism 
is the prevailing ideology. It is uncertain, however, how 
overlapping consensus would transfer to a world with a 
plethora of religions and ideologies.
A few questions are left unanswered: Are we dependent 
on a struggling world like Anarres to achieve a utopia? Do 
we need an opposite, like the Anarri and the Urrasti, to 
unite us? If these are necessary for a utopia, then perhaps 
we need a crisis as provocation. We should remember, ho-
wever, that this is not a blueprint, nor a simple thought ex-
periment, but a written world meant as a reflection on the 
unwritten world. By speculating on today’s society with 
tomorrow’s outlook, Le Guin is able to change the utopian 
perspective. In addition, it underlines Rawls’ point of not 
limiting ourselves to the actual, but always have a “reaso-
nable hope” of something better.
4. Conclusion
I have argued that there are four ways in which Le Guin’s 
ambiguous utopia can improve the Rawlsian realistic 
utopia: (1) clear up misunderstandings around the con-
cept utopia, (2) clarify Rawls’ own skepticism of utopian 
thought, (3) resolve criticism from the Cosmopolitan and 
the Realist, and (4) change the conception of utopia.
First, a utopia should not apply to both the quixotic 
and the ideal, only the latter. We can criticize a utopia 
for being quixotic, but this should not be implied in the 
concept itself. Second, Le Guin is not letting means be 
justified by ends in her utopian vision. The ambiguous 
utopia is not quixotic and not dogmatic. Le Guin relieves 
Rawlsian skepticism with her own skeptical utopia. Third, 
Le Guin’s utopia alleviates some of the criticism from the 
Realist and the Cosmopolitan. The Realist’s main criticism 
is that the Rawlsian realistic utopia is quixotic. I hope, by 
now, you agree that Le Guin’s utopia is not unlikely, un-
realistic or impractical. If anything, it is based on realism 
and practicality. The unlikelihood only lies in its fictiona-
lity, but as a written world it attempts only to describe, not 
to predict. Furthermore, the Realist’s emphasis on conflict 
and regress in society is constantly happening—and ex-
pected to—in an ambiguous utopia. The criticism from 
the Realist should, therefore, be resolved.26
The Cosmopolitan might object that the utopian vi-
sion of a perfectionist society still stands. The appropriate 
objection from the Cosmopolitan should be, however, 
that a realistic utopia is not idealistic. Not being rooted 
in reality, however, it is unclear what the Cosmopolitan 
—with the orthodox utopian vision—can achieve. My 
defense of a realistic utopia from the Cosmopolitan, there-
fore, lies in denouncing the orthodox notion of utopia for 
its quixoticness. This does not resolve the criticism from 
the Cosmopolitan completely, but it does, if nothing else, 
assuage the criticism. I think the Rawlsian and the Realist 
would concur. 
Fourth, Le Guin’s utopia is preferable to the orthodox 
utopia: it is a possible utopia, and it is rooted in reality and 
human nature. This applies directly to one of the main qu-
estions Rawls endeavors to answer in The Law of Peoples: Is 
a realistic utopia possible? (1999, 5-6). If we remain under 
the current, orthodox conception of utopia, this amounts 
to a contradiction; is something unreachable reachable? 
Utopia, as it is commonly understood, is in itself a parody: 
a perfect society you would be naive to believe in. Why 
not resolve this parody by making utopia an actual and 
reachable condition? The conception of utopia from The 
Dispossessed is one the Rawlsian should adopt because it is 
how utopia ought to be conceived.
The very idea of a perfect society is unrealistic. Indeed, 
as we saw from the thought experiment, one might not 
even want to choose a perfect society over a planet that is 
similar to earth. Le Guin’s utopia is not a perfect society. 
Rather, it is a society that teaches us something about how 
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ideal and perfect a society can be, while still being con-
nected to the real world. The utopian concept should not 
pertain to a “perfect society” existing in its own bubble 
outside of time and place. Utopia should not be a final 
state, but of comparative quality, taking into account fac-
tors such as time, place and its inhabitants. If you want 
to create a perfect world for humans, then you should 
include the human factor. The concept “utopia” should 
not be synonymous with the unrealistic, impracticable 
and idealistic, because the ideal society, within the correct 
framework, should be realistic. Anarres is an ideal society 
despite the conditions on the planet. Anarres is a utopia.
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NOTES
1 According to Rawls, each citizen has their own comprehensive doc-
trine. If citizens are reasonable, however, they will not impose their doc-
trines on others who are willing to agree upon mutually beneficial rules.
2 I will concentrate on ideal theory in The Law of Peoples, where Rawls 
(1999) first expounded his theory of a realistic utopia within the context 
of global justice.
3 Realism, in this context, refers to international or political realism. 
Cosmopolitanism refers to liberal or political cosmopolitanism. The spe-
cifics of each affiliation are, however, of little interest here. The relevance 
for this essay lies in their core ideas and specific criticism raised against 
Rawls.
4 Sowell calls them constrained (realistic) and unconstrained (utopian) 
vision.
5 Rawls advocates that not just individuals but peoples have moral status.
6 Judith Shklar endorses an anti-utopian skepticism (Benhabib 1994, 
477-80).
7 Galston finds overlapping consensus so unrealistic that it is not even 
worth discussing. Then, he goes on to discuss it.
8 Galston regards it as a historical accident.
9 Mouffe (2016, 17) even builds conflict into the definition of the politi-
cal realm.
10 A modus vivendi is a temporary arrangement in the wait for a so-
lution. Rawls perceives modus vivendi as political in the wrong way. 
Bernard Williams disapproves, calling Rawls’ rejection of modus viv-
endi a utopian distance from real politics that is potentially dangerous 
(Galston 2010, 388).
11 See, for instance, Pogge for this view (Audard 2006, 1-2).
12 Pogge (1989, 196) criticizes Rawls for not allowing a global difference 
principle involving a global tax on wealthy societies to be redistributed to 
less advantaged societies.
13 Quixotic, as a reminder, means something idealistic, unrealistic and/
or impractical.
14 That being said, what follows will underline the removal of quixotic 
from utopia, as it is a more realistic utopia.
15 More criticizes his Utopia, saying more work was needed, thereby 
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implying it was a work in progress. My argument, following Le Guin, is 
that a utopia will always be a work in progress.
16 The idea of an ideal society, however, is much older, and can (at least) 
be traced back to Plato’s Republic.
17 It might be an ideal society, but it can never exist.
18 Utopia’s evil twin, dystopia, is a depiction of a bad place. Sometimes 
the differences are, quite ominously, hard to distinguish. If nothing else, 
dystopias and utopias can be helpful indicators of how un-utopian our 
world is.
19 For brevity, I have limited myself to a handful of utopian elements 
of Anarres. The importance for this essay is not the details of the world, 
but the principles behind it. Furthermore, the reader is not given an 
abundance of utopian specifics by Le Guin, since this would make it a 
blueprint.
20 This aligns with Rawls’ distinction between reasonableness and ra-
tionality. It is better to organize a society based on principles about what 
is right, and then let people seek out on their own for what is good 
(Curtis 2005, 266).
21 Contrary to the orthodox notion of utopia, where everyone seems 
to agree on everything, and no individuals seem to protest. As if ask-
ing, why would anyone have reason to protest in a utopia? This is naive. 
Furthermore, Le Guin’s notion of a utopia is more adapted to Rawlsian 
ideas assuming reasonable pluralism, instead of universal agreement.
22 Central to Le Guin’s notion of a utopia—hitherto ignored—is anar-
chism, a political idea in conflict with Rawlsian ideas. I am not arguing, 
however, that the Rawslian should adopt this exact utopia, something 
both impossible and beside the point. Anarres is a written world; a 
description, not a prediction. What I am arguing is that the Rawlsian 
should adopt, the above-mentioned, core ideas behind it. Anarchism, 
therefore, need not be adopted. That being said, the anarchistic moti-
vation—skepticism towards capitalistic systems—aligns nicely with the 
Rawlsian idea of constructing justice that extends beyond the actual, giv-
ing rise to a new political reality that is more just than the current state 
of affairs (Rawls 1999, 12). We see, therefore, that the motivation behind 
a realistic utopia and an ambiguous utopia is the same, but the political 
method of achieving an ideal society is different.
23 All commonly connected with—and used as criticism against—a uto-
pia. In our new conception of utopia, they are all removed.
24 Sometimes, however, they need a reminder.
25 Indeed, happiness cannot be justified by the sacrifice of the few for 
the many. In The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas, Le Guin (1973) 
depicts a utopian world whose fortunes depend on the perpetual misery 
of a child, a sacrifice unacceptable to both Le Guin and Rawls. It is an 
epitome of the Rawlsian maximin principle (maximising the position of 
the worst-off) as an argument against Utilitarianism.
26 The criticism from the Realist that a realistic utopia is not being re-
alistic enough might still stand. This has, however, not been my aim to 
disprove in this essay.
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